Coordinating farms in collective agri-environmental schemes: the role of conditional incentives.

This article examines a novel collective agri-environmental scheme (cAES) implemented in Alsace, France, aimed at conserving the endangered European hamster (Cricetus cricetus) by incentivizing farmers to collectively maintain a threshold percentage of favorable habitat crops. Unlike traditional individual contracts, this cAES provides conditional subsidies only if the collective land contribution within a defined zone reaches at least 24 percent of favorable crops, with payments increasing up to a 40 percent ceiling. The study finds that farmers with larger territorial shares within collective zones are more likely to participate and contribute greater land areas, while group size positively influences participation but not individual contribution levels. The research identifies distinct contributor types—such as stable leaders and fluctuating marginal contributors—and highlights the importance of local leadership and spill-over effects in enhancing collective environmental action over time. These findings underscore the need to target influential farms and optimize group sizes for effective collective conservation contracts, while acknowledging contextual limitations to broader generalization.