JOURNAL ARTICLE

Henry of Ghent on the Relational Character of Causal Powers.

  • Published In: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2025, v. 63, n. 1. P. 27 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Löwe, Can Laurens; Shaftoe, Gillian 3 of 3

Abstract

Henry of Ghent contends that a causal power is a relation that a substance bears to an act. Scholars have taken this relational account to commit Henry to the Megaric view that a power exists only if it is actualized. We argue that this reading is mistaken because, for Henry, a power is not a "real relation" between a substance and an act. Rather, it is a "relation of reason." We then consider the worry that if a power is a relation of reason, it is a partially mind-dependent entity. We argue that this worry is unfounded because Henry's claim that a power is a relation of reason is not so much a claim about what a power is, metaphysically speaking, but rather a claim about how we must conceptualize it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Journal of the History of Philosophy. 2025/01, Vol. 63, Issue 1, p27
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Biography
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:0022-5053
  • DOI:10.1353/hph.2025.a950462
  • Accession Number:182884528
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