The Gordian Knot of Consciousness Meets the Sword of Darwinism.

This article critically examines Walter Veit's "pathological complexity thesis" as a Darwinian explanation for the origins of consciousness, particularly in relation to autopoiesis theory. It distinguishes between two versions of autopoiesis: "autopoiesis 1.0," the original mechanistic and internalist account by Maturana and Varela that rejects teleonomic explanations, and "autopoiesis 2.0," influenced by Hans Jonas's philosophy of nature, which embraces teleology and posits all life as sentient. The article argues that Veit's critique conflates these versions and that his philosophy of nature approach to consciousness differs fundamentally from the phenomenologically grounded autopoietic enactivism associated with the Jonasian turn. It suggests that despite their differences, Veit's work and autopoietic enactivism could benefit from dialogue to better integrate evolutionary and phenomenological perspectives on consciousness.