Bargaining as a Struggle Between Competing Attempts at Commitment.

This article develops a formal infinite-horizon bargaining model centered on strategic commitment arising from costly concessions, building on Schelling's (1956) theory. It shows that players' commitment ability is endogenous, depending on their demands, and that equilibrium outcomes involve either immediate agreement on compatible demands or delay characterized by incompatible demands followed by costly concessions. The model provides a strategic foundation for the Kalai bargaining solution, demonstrating that as concession costs become arbitrarily high, the set of renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equilibria converges to a unique efficient outcome corresponding to the Kalai solution, with the bargaining power proportion determined by players' discount factors and relative concession costs. The analysis distinguishes between renegotiation-proof equilibria, which feature no delay, and Markov perfect equilibria, which may exhibit delay and gradualism in demands, and discusses how concession costs—arising from political audience costs, delegated bargaining incentives, or social "face"—shape bargaining power and outcomes. This work contributes to the Nash programme by linking institutional features of bargaining environments to appropriate cooperative solution concepts.