JOURNAL ARTICLE

Popular Control of Taxation, Accountability, and the Redefinition of Political Subordination (Germany, Seventeenth–Eighteenth Centuries).

  • Published In: Journal of Social History, 2024, v. 58, n. 1. P. 124 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Renault, Rachel 3 of 3

Abstract

This article examines how taxation in early modern Germany, particularly in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Thuringia, functioned not only as a tool of state control but also as a means by which ordinary taxpayers exercised popular control over authorities. By refusing or contesting tax payments, subjects negotiated political subordination through demands for transparency, fairness (Billigkeit), and consent in tax collection, thereby challenging the exclusive prerogatives of territorial princes and imperial estates. The complex, fractal power structure of the Holy Roman Empire enabled subjects to form strategic alliances with rival authorities and external courts, such as the Imperial Aulic Council and the Electorate of Saxony, to verify tax amounts and seek accountability. Despite harsh reprisals and official violence against collective tax protests, these practices of popular control persisted over decades, reflecting a nuanced interplay between resistance and cooperation that redefined the conditions of political and fiscal subjection.

Additional Information

  • Source:Journal of Social History. 2024/09, Vol. 58, Issue 1, p124
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Business and Management
  • Publication Date:2024
  • ISSN:0022-4529
  • DOI:10.1093/jsh/shad045
  • Accession Number:179619944
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