Third party interventions promote cooperation on the interdependent networks: A perspective based on prospect theory.

The article focuses on the impact of third-party intervention on the evolution of cooperation among disputants within interdependent networks, incorporating prospect theory to account for individuals' risk attitudes toward perceived gains and losses. Using evolutionary game theory models—specifically the prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games—played on two interconnected sub-networks representing interveners and disputants, the study finds that third-party intervention promotes cooperation by rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors, with cooperation levels increasing as intervention intensity and returns rise but decreasing with higher intervention costs. These results hold across different network topologies, including square lattices and Erdös–Rényi random networks, suggesting that governments or organizations mediating conflicts should consider disputants' subjective risk preferences to effectively foster cooperation. The research provides a theoretical framework for understanding how third-party actions influence cooperative behavior in complex social systems.