Board composition and performance of state-owned enterprises: quasi-experimental evidence.

This article investigates the causal impact of board composition reforms on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Italy, focusing on two laws enacted in 2011–2012: the Golfo-Mosca Law, which mandated gender quotas on boards, and the Severino Law, which restricted appointments of former local politicians to SOE boards. Using a difference-in-differences approach comparing SOEs (majority public ownership) to firms with minority public ownership exempt from the reforms, the study finds that these policies increased female representation and reduced former politicians on SOE boards, leading to younger and more talented boards. While labor productivity remained unchanged, firm profitability improved, leverage decreased, and corporate credit risk was reduced. Additionally, for SOEs providing local public services, citizens' satisfaction and objective quality measures of services such as water distribution and waste management improved, indicating enhanced social performance alongside financial outcomes.