Navigating Conflicting Incentives: Discursive Strategies of Political Parties in Germany's Cooperative Federalism.

This article examines how political parties in Germany navigate the conflicting incentives of cooperation and self-interest inherent in federal systems through their parliamentary discourses during the COVID-19 crisis. Using a qualitative content analysis of 212 debates and 4,524 coded statements, the study identifies five distinct discursive strategies—three self-serving ("finding a scapegoat," "passing responsibility," and "self-praise") and two cooperative ("showcasing federal cooperation" and "highlighting the value of federalism"). Findings show that parties more integrated into intergovernmental bodies and coalition governments tend to adopt cooperative discourse and softer self-serving strategies, while opposition parties and excluded parties like the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) rely more on confrontational scapegoating. The study also highlights the role of Germany's vertically integrated party system in fostering intra-party solidarity across federal levels, mitigating blame games, and notes that cooperative norms persisted during early pandemic phases but declined amid prolonged crisis pressures. These insights contribute to understanding the adaptability and robustness of cooperative federalism under stress and suggest avenues for comparative research in other federal systems.