Online customized strategy for manufacturers to counter showrooming behavior in a dual-channel supply chain.

This article examines the impact of consumer showrooming behavior—where consumers inspect products in offline stores but purchase them online—on a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer selling directly online and wholesaling to an offline retailer. Using game theory, it finds that showrooming intensifies price competition, lowers prices, and increases sales volumes in both channels, generally harming the manufacturer’s profit and potentially damaging the retailer’s profit depending on transportation costs and consumer preferences. To counter showrooming’s negative effects, the study proposes an online customized strategy where the manufacturer offers exclusive customized products online while the retailer sells only standard products offline. This strategy tends to reduce the retailer’s profit but can improve the manufacturer’s profit and overall social welfare under certain market conditions, highlighting the importance for manufacturers to carefully assess consumer instant gratification and customization effectiveness before implementation.