When Budget Controls Backfire: Why Rankings and Resource Competition Can Spark Collusive Misreporting.

  • Published In: Strategic Finance, 2025. P. 1 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Maussen, Sophie; Verniest, Melissa; Waeye, Dwight 3 of 3

Abstract

The article examines how budgeting practices, specifically rankings based on relative cost target attainment and resource competition, can influence collusive misreporting among managers. It highlights that while rankings can deter collusion in environments with low resource competition, they may inadvertently encourage it when competition for funding is high. The study emphasizes the importance of aligning performance evaluation systems with resource allocation policies to effectively discourage unethical reporting behaviors. Ultimately, the findings suggest that the effectiveness of budget controls is contingent upon the broader internal reporting environment within organizations. [Extracted from the article]

Additional Information

  • Source:Strategic Finance. 2025/10, p1
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Economics
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:1524-833X
  • Accession Number:188868494
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