The 'crisis' of antitrust economics.

This article critically examines whether the alleged under-enforcement of competition (antitrust) laws in the EU, UK, and US is attributable to the adoption of a "more-economics approach" in antitrust enforcement. It explores key criticisms that this approach, which emphasizes economic analysis and the consumer welfare standard, has led to leniency by focusing excessively on avoiding false convictions (Type I errors) while underestimating the costs of false acquittals (Type II errors). The author finds mixed evidence regarding ideological bias, complexity of economic models, and the impact of economic frameworks on legal standards, concluding that economics itself is not primarily responsible for under-enforcement. Instead, factors such as judicial attitudes, institutional considerations, and the limited practical role of economics in enforcement decisions play significant roles. The article advocates for improved economic tools, greater transparency, and balanced scrutiny of both economic and non-economic evidence to enhance antitrust enforcement.