JOURNAL ARTICLE

Rejoinder: Dynamic Incentives in Sales Force Compensation.

  • Published In: Marketing Science (INFORMS), 2024, v. 43, n. 1. P. 232 1 of 3

  • Database: Business Source Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Rubel, Olivier; Prasad, Ashutosh 3 of 3

Abstract

This article focuses on the analysis of dynamic incentives in sales force compensation, specifically examining the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation from a prior study (RP16). It confirms that for sales agents with high risk aversion, the optimal compensation plan remains concave, consistent with RP16's findings. However, for agents with low risk aversion, the compensation design problem is more complex, potentially involving corner solutions or chattering, and requires further investigation. The authors suggest that future research should explore whether convex compensation plans could serve as practical approximations in these low-risk-aversion cases.

Additional Information

  • Source:Marketing Science (INFORMS). 2024/01, Vol. 43, Issue 1, p232
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Economics
  • Publication Date:2024
  • ISSN:0732-2399
  • DOI:10.1287/mksc.2022.0423
  • Accession Number:174880990
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Marketing Science (INFORMS) is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research & the Management Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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