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On the design of an optimal immigration policy.

  • Published In: Economic Inquiry, 2025, v. 63, n. 1. P. 47 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Lopez‐Velasco, Armando R. 3 of 3

Abstract

This paper constructs a model for the study of optimal immigration from the perspective of natives. They have preferences over redistributive transfers, a public good subject to congestion, and over the level of family‐based migration. Border enforcement is costly. The model derives conditions for an optimal immigration policy, which balances skill‐based against family‐based migration, equalizes the fiscal opportunity cost of unauthorized immigration with the marginal cost of enforcement, and balances the effects on transfers against the implied congestion effects. A parameterized version of the model studies the 1994–2008 period and finds legislation projects on immigration consistent with the model's predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Economic Inquiry. 2025/01, Vol. 63, Issue 1, p47
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Economics
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:0095-2583
  • DOI:10.1111/ecin.13260
  • Accession Number:181889677
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Economic Inquiry is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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