Experimentation at the WTO lab: towards a better 'Interface' to accommodate State-owned enterprises.

This article critically examines the World Trade Organization's (WTO) existing "interface mechanism" for regulating State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), particularly in non-market economies such as China. Revisiting John H. Jackson's foundational Interface Theory alongside David Kennedy's critiques, it identifies key limitations including a market-centric focus disconnected from broader international law, oversimplified dichotomies between international economic flows and national policies, and ambiguous WTO terminology coupled with a passive enforcement stance. The article analyzes the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) SOE rules, noting their innovative ownership-based definitions and behavioral obligations but concluding they remain insufficient for fully addressing the complexities of state participation in the economy. It proposes leveraging the WTO as a global policy laboratory to foster a more inclusive, adaptable interface mechanism that accommodates diverse national SOE reforms, highlighting China's mixed-ownership reform as a promising case study for such experimental dialogue and mutual learning.