JOURNAL ARTICLE

GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM.

  • Published In: International Economic Review, 2023, v. 64, n. 1. P. 413 1 of 3

  • Database: Business Source Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Lee, Frances Xu; Suen, Wing 3 of 3

Abstract

A university uses both early‐stage selection outcome (high‐school affiliation) and late‐stage admission test outcome (standardized test scores) to select students. We use this model to study policies that have been proposed to combat inefficient gaming in college admissions. Increasing university enrollment size can exacerbate gaming and worsen the selection outcome. Abolishing standardized tests for university admissions increases gaming targeting high‐school admissions and worsens the selection outcome, whereas eliminating high‐school ability sorting may improve the university selection outcome under some cost conditions of gaming. Committing to a lower‐powered selection scheme can improve the selection outcome by reducing gaming behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:International Economic Review. 2023/02, Vol. 64, Issue 1, p413
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Education
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:0020-6598
  • DOI:10.1111/iere.12591
  • Accession Number:161605599
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of International Economic Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Looking to go deeper into this topic? Look for more articles on EBSCOhost.