JOURNAL ARTICLE

PRICES, POLITICS AND PERSUASION: THE CASE OF POLLUTION CONTROL AND CLEAN TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION.

  • Published In: Singapore Economic Review, 2024, v. 69, n. 5. P. 1685 1 of 3

  • Database: Business Source Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: CHENG, WENLI; ZHANG, DINGSHENG 3 of 3

Abstract

This paper presents three simple models to study how prices, politics and persuasion may each play a role in environmental policy-making. Our conclusions are twofold. First, in the absence of increasing returns, requiring the polluting industry to purchase pollution permits can internalize the negative externality of pollution, and the optimal price of pollution permits should increase with the disutility of pollution. Second, with increasing returns in the industry using clean technologies, it is welfare enhancing to complement the pollution permits policy with a tax-funded subsidy to the clean industry, or with a tax-funded public campaign to persuade consumers to move away from pollution-generating goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Singapore Economic Review. 2024/09, Vol. 69, Issue 5, p1685
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Environmental Sciences
  • Publication Date:2024
  • ISSN:0217-5908
  • DOI:10.1142/S0217590823420018
  • Accession Number:180410032
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Singapore Economic Review is the property of World Scientific Publishing Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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