On the Other Side of the Fence: Property Rights and Productivity in the United States.

This article evaluates whether well-defined access rights to publicly owned land can match privatization in enhancing productivity and wealth, focusing on the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act in the Western United States. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design and satellite vegetation data, it finds that public lands with secure access rights for ranchers exhibit about 10% higher productivity and significantly greater income and property values compared to open-access lands. Comparing these access rights to privatized lands sold shortly before the Act reveals no significant difference in productivity gains, suggesting that government-enforced access rights can be as effective as private property in managing common-pool resources. The study also highlights that the success of access rights depends on sufficient state capacity and low transaction costs, with enforcement and transferability being crucial for sustainable and profitable land use. These findings imply that regulated access rights may offer a viable and potentially more equitable alternative to privatization, especially in contexts with strong governance.