JOURNAL ARTICLE

Rethinking Command in Iraq: George Casey and Multi-National Forces-Iraq, 2004-2007.

  • Published In: Journal of Military History, 2026, v. 90, n. 2. P. 429 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Fawley III, Darrell E. 3 of 3

Abstract

In the narrative of the Iraq War, General George Casey has taken on the role of a conventional, inflexible commander who turned away from counterinsurgency and pushed hard to get U.S. troops out of Iraq. The situation was bad when he handed command to General David Petraeus, who oversaw a dramatic turnaround. New evidence has emerged that warrants a re-evaluation of Casey's approach to Iraq, though; it demonstrates that Casey may have been the chief driver of improved counterinsurgency understanding in the U.S. military prior to the publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and that Casey established conditions from which his successor benefited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Journal of Military History. 2026/04, Vol. 90, Issue 2, p429
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Geography and Cartography
  • Publication Date:2026
  • ISSN:0899-3718
  • Accession Number:192454920
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