The social epistemology of introspection.

  • Published In: Mind & Language, 2023, v. 38, n. 3. P. 925 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Unnsteinsson, Elmar 3 of 3

Abstract

I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by social epistemology applies to introspection and other forms of self‐directed representation. If so, it becomes unclear in what sense social epistemology is social. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Mind & Language. 2023/06, Vol. 38, Issue 3, p925
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Health and Medicine
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:0268-1064
  • DOI:10.1111/mila.12438
  • Accession Number:164255304
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Mind & Language is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Looking to go deeper into this topic? Look for more articles on EBSCOhost.