Lie–truth judgments: adaptive lie detector account and truth-default theory compared and contrasted.

This article compares and contrasts two contemporary theoretical perspectives on how people make lie–truth judgments: the adaptive lie detector account (ALIED) and truth-default theory (TDT). ALIED, rooted in cognitive psychology, posits that individuals use Bayesian reasoning to integrate individuating information (specific cues related to a statement) and context-general information (broader beliefs about honesty) to adaptively judge veracity, with no functional distinction between truth and lie judgments. In contrast, TDT, grounded in communication theory, argues that humans default to believing others (the truth-default state) unless triggered by suspicion or skepticism, making lie judgments qualitatively different and typically requiring conscious triggers. Both theories explain the common truth bias in deception detection but differ on mechanisms, the likelihood and nature of lie bias, and the role of diagnostic information. The article highlights the need for further empirical testing to falsify or support these models and suggests that their differing assumptions and predictions offer avenues for future research in deception detection.