Unraveling Labor Market Collusion: A Comprehensive Analysis Under EU Competition Law.

The article focuses on the role of competition law in addressing anti-competitive practices in labor markets, particularly the often-overlooked issue of monopsony power—the concentration of buying power by employers. It explains that monopsony and monopoly power similarly harm competition by restricting output or wages, reducing employee mobility, and stifling innovation. Key labor market collusions examined include no-poach agreements, wage-fixing cartels, and the exchange of competitively sensitive information, all of which can restrict competition "by object" under EU competition law. The article argues that competition law’s primary goal should be protecting the competitive process rather than focusing solely on welfare outcomes or public policy objectives like wage increases. It further distinguishes between naked no-poach cartels, ancillary restraints within legitimate business agreements, and hub-and-spoke schemes, emphasizing that enforcement should consider the economic and legal context to determine whether such agreements unlawfully restrict competition.