Contingent Existence, Worthwhile Lives, and Humane Animal Slaughter.

The article examines whether the contingent existence and worthwhile lives of humanely raised farm animals morally justify their humane slaughter. It critically analyzes two ethical principles often invoked to defend such slaughter: one inspired by the non-identity problem, which exonerates actions maximizing an individual's well-being but generally fails to justify slaughter due to farmers' obligations of care; and another, derived from Loren Lomasky's view, which claims that actions necessary to a practice benefiting both humans and animals are permissible. The author argues that while the first principle is defensible yet limited in scope, the second principle—especially when refined—fails to justify humane slaughter because inclusion in a beneficial practice does not negate the wrongness of killing, particularly when the agent created the animal and thus has special obligations not to harm it. Overall, the article concludes that contingent existence and worthwhile life facts do not, by themselves or combined with these principles, generally render humane animal slaughter morally permissible.