JOURNAL ARTICLE
Good Governance and the Partisan Wars: The Effects of Divided Government on Administrative Problem Solving and Oversight Agenda Setting in Congress.
Published In: Political Science Quarterly (Oxford University Press / USA), 2024, v. 139, n. 2. P. 201 1 of 3
Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: Leavitt, Claire 3 of 3
Abstract
This article examines how partisanship, particularly divided government, influences Congress’s oversight and legislative responses to federal agencies and programs identified as high risk by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Using GAO’s biennial high-risk lists from 1990 to 2018 as a benchmark for urgent administrative problems, the study finds that Congress is more likely to hold oversight hearings and enact legislation addressing these issues when the presidency and at least one chamber of Congress are controlled by opposing parties. Notably, House committees prioritize GAO-flagged problems more under divided government, suggesting that partisan incentives may increase attention to administrative vulnerabilities rather than detract from them. The findings highlight a complex relationship between partisanship and oversight, where political motivations coexist with substantive responses to nonpartisan assessments of bureaucratic waste, fraud, and abuse.
Additional Information
- Source:Political Science Quarterly (Oxford University Press / USA). 2024/06, Vol. 139, Issue 2, p201
- Document Type:Article
- Subject Area:History
- Publication Date:2024
- ISSN:0032-3195
- DOI:10.1093/psquar/qqae003
- Accession Number:177720773
- Copyright Statement:Copyright of Political Science Quarterly (Oxford University Press / USA) is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Looking to go deeper into this topic? Look for more articles on EBSCOhost.