Epistemological Cognition in Husserl.

The article focuses on Edmund Husserl’s view of epistemological cognition, arguing that he is committed to its infallibility, particularly in solving what he calls the "problem of transcendence"—the question of how cognition can validly reach objects that are not given within consciousness itself. Husserl’s Non-Transcendence Constraint holds that this problem cannot be solved by using the very kind of cognition whose possibility is in question, thereby excluding fallible (transcendent) cognition as a solution. The article traces four specifications of the problem—metaphysical, mereological, intuitional, and epistemic transcendence—concluding that Husserl ultimately frames it as the problem of the possibility of fallible cognition. Consequently, epistemological cognition must be infallible to address this problem. While some commentators dispute Husserl’s commitment to infallibility, the article contends that his core epistemological beliefs entail it, and that abandoning these beliefs requires substantial justification.