How Not to Defend Aesthetic Autonomism.

This article critically examines a recent proposal to redefine aesthetic autonomism, the view that the aesthetic value of an artwork is independent of its moral value. The author argues that the proposed redefinition—framing autonomism as the rational permissibility of not adjusting one's aesthetic judgment in light of moral evaluation—is flawed because it narrowly focuses on evaluative adjustments, misinterprets the rationality involved, and leads to a permissive conception that distorts the core debate. The discussion highlights the distinction between aesthetic and moral evaluations of artworks, emphasizing that the normative outlook an artwork expresses can be subject to moral assessment, and explores how autonomists and non-autonomists differ on whether moral considerations should influence aesthetic evaluation. Ultimately, the article defends the traditional understanding of autonomism as a substantive normative claim about the irrelevance of moral features to aesthetic evaluation, cautioning against conflating this with broader permissive or rationality-based interpretations.