The degradation of the analytic-synthetic method in Herbert Spencer's sociology.

This article examines Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* as a case study illustrating the degradation of the analytic-synthetic method, originally introduced into civil philosophy by Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. It argues that Spencer's sociology, despite its apparent inductive-deductive structure, tacitly reproduces a weakened form of this older method, marked by theoretical constructs such as the "primitive man," a dualistic typology of societies (military and industrial), and an ambiguous use of the "survival of the fittest" principle. The study highlights Spencer's epistemological ambiguity, showing how his work simultaneously conceals and extends Hobbesian analytical patterns while adapting them to a sociological modernity that undermines their original rigor. This analysis invites reconsideration of Spencer's methodological legacy and draws attention to the broader phenomenon of scientific methods' erosion during epistemological transitions.