Exploring the Repercussions of Bilateral Military Intrusions in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia and Kenya's Invasion of Somalia.

This article examines the largely unsuccessful military interventions by Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia, analyzing why these operations failed to fully achieve their stated foreign policy objectives. Using a process tracing methodology and the "good enough" approach to measure success, the study finds that Ethiopia's intervention was hindered by inadequate pre-intervention planning, complex intervening coalitions, and longstanding hostile historical relations with Somalia. Kenya's intervention similarly suffered from poor planning, domestic political challenges, diplomatic crises, and regional rivalries, which undermined its goals of defeating al-Shabaab and establishing a secure buffer zone. Both countries initially made territorial gains against insurgents but ultimately failed to dismantle al-Shabaab's capabilities or stabilize the region, illustrating that military force alone was insufficient without complementary diplomatic and political strategies.