Defending the Doctrine of the Mean Against Counterexamples: A General Strategy.

  • Published In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2024, v. 105, n. 2. P. 267 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Colgrove, Nicholas 3 of 3

Abstract

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues – like honesty, fair‐mindedness, and patience – are counterexamples to Aristotle's doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but taking it seriously also allows us to gain substantial insight into particular virtues. Failure to take the doctrine seriously, moreover, exposes us to the risk of mistaking certain vices for virtues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 2024/06, Vol. 105, Issue 2, p267
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:History
  • Publication Date:2024
  • ISSN:0279-0750
  • DOI:10.1111/papq.12457
  • Accession Number:177717799
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