JOURNAL ARTICLE

Suppose We Know Things.

  • Published In: Episteme (Cambridge University Press), 2023, v. 20, n. 2. P. 308 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Duncan, Matt 3 of 3

Abstract

When contemporary philosophers discuss the nature of knowledge, or conduct debates that the nature of knowledge is relevant to, they typically treat all knowledge as propositional. However, recent introductory epistemology texts and encyclopedia entries often mention three kinds of knowledge: (i) propositional knowledge, (ii) abilities knowledge, and (iii) knowledge of things/by acquaintance. This incongruity is striking for a number of reasons, one of which is that what kinds of knowledge there are is relevant to various debates in philosophy. In this paper I focus on this point as it relates to the third kind of knowledge mentioned above – knowledge of things. I start by supposing that we have knowledge of things, and then I show how this supposition reshapes various debates in philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Episteme (Cambridge University Press). 2023/06, Vol. 20, Issue 2, p308
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:History
  • Publication Date:2023
  • ISSN:1742-3600
  • DOI:10.1017/epi.2021.29
  • Accession Number:163705612
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Episteme (Cambridge University Press) is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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