The antitrust victims of monopsony.

This article examines the exercise of unlawful monopsony power by buyer cartels, which lowers both prices paid to suppliers and quantities purchased, thereby reducing producer surplus and overall social welfare. It identifies six classes of antitrust victims harmed by such conduct but notes that under current U.S. law—specifically section 4 of the Clayton Act—only direct suppliers who sell to the monopsonist or cartel have standing to sue for antitrust damages, leaving five other victim groups uncompensated. These neglected groups include suppliers priced out of the market, indirect suppliers, umbrella suppliers (those selling to non-colluding buyers affected by the cartel), suppliers of complementary inputs, and consumers of the monopsonist's output. The article argues for expanding antitrust standing to these additional victims to improve compensation and deterrence, while also discussing legal precedents, economic consequences, and potential challenges such as over-deterrence and complexity in damage apportionment.