Intrinsic Properties and the Problem of "Other Things".

  • Published In: Ratio, 2025, v. 38, n. 1. P. 8 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Wasserman, Ryan 3 of 3

Abstract

Intrinsic properties are those which cannot be had or lacked in virtue of other things. Being a square is intrinsic, in this sense, whereas being next to a square is not. But what, exactly, counts as an "other thing" in this context? As it turns out, this is a surprisingly difficult question. I provide a critical assessment of three existing proposals (in terms of identity, mereology, and ontology), before developing my own, alternative account. Along the way, we highlight ways in which this project intersects with other philosophical issues, including debates over the nature of existence, the essentiality of origins, and the truth of priority monism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Ratio. 2025/03, Vol. 38, Issue 1, p8
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:History
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:0034-0006
  • DOI:10.1111/rati.12425
  • Accession Number:183858489
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