Non-State Actors, Sub-Conventional Warfare, and India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis Stability/Instability.

The article examines the complex stability-instability paradox in the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship, emphasizing how non-state actors engaged in sub-conventional warfare exacerbate nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia. It highlights that both India and Pakistan exploit militant proxy groups to advance strategic objectives, particularly in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region and Balochistan, fueling recurring crises with potential nuclear escalation. Despite some confidence-building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction agreements, the article argues these are insufficient amid evolving military doctrines—such as India's Cold Start and Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons—and ongoing geopolitical tensions. The authors conclude that without enhanced diplomatic engagement and effective nuclear escalation controls, terrorist acts by non-state actors could trigger a nuclear crisis, underscoring the urgent need for strengthened bilateral mechanisms to manage conflict and reduce the risk of escalation.