The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies.
Published In: Governance, 2023, v. 36, n. 2. P. 673 1 of 3
Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: Woo, Yujin 3 of 3
Abstract
In order to ensure their own and their regime survival, the author argues that dictators generate electioneering strategies based on their mobilization capabilities. He conceptualizes the election design as an amalgamation of diverse electioneering strategies that are implemented based upon a dictator's rationalist incentives to stay in office. I Why do some leaders of electoral authoritarianism refrain from using overt electioneering strategies?. [Extracted from the article]
Additional Information
- Source:Governance. 2023/04, Vol. 36, Issue 2, p673
- Document Type:Article
- Subject Area:History
- Publication Date:2023
- ISSN:0952-1895
- DOI:10.1111/gove.12772
- Accession Number:162595367
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