Hayek and Schmitt on the 'depoliticization' of the economy.

This article examines the critiques of economic interest groups in modern democracies by Friedrich Hayek and Carl Schmitt, focusing on their similar diagnoses of rent-seeking behavior and their contrasting solutions. Schmitt advocates for "depoliticization" through an authoritarian state combined with a corporatist economic system that integrates interest groups under state control, while Hayek proposes constitutional limits on politicians’ ability to grant special privileges to economic groups within a liberal democratic framework. The paper argues that, unlike Schmitt’s authoritarian approach, Hayek’s solution is not undemocratic when democracy is understood beyond pure majoritarianism, as it involves constitutional constraints designed to protect market freedom without abolishing democratic processes. It further clarifies that Schmitt’s model does not support free markets, whereas Hayek’s model constitution aims to reduce rent seeking by reforming democratic institutions.