The Parliament and Cooperative Oversight of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Why Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia is Stable but Still in Transition.

The article examines parliamentary oversight of the military in transitioning democracies, focusing on Indonesia as a case study. It identifies three types of parliamentary oversight—intrusive, reactive, and cooperative—and argues that cooperative oversight, characterized by collaborative and trust-based relations between parliament, the military, and the executive, is prevalent in Indonesia due to the parliament's limited institutional capacity and the military's retained autonomy. While cooperative oversight stabilizes civil–military relations by fostering harmonious interactions and voluntary information sharing, it also impedes deeper civil–military reforms, weakens democratic management of the defense sector, and increases reliance on the President's appointment power over the armed forces. The study suggests that strengthening Indonesia's parliamentary oversight will require enhancing institutional capacity and adopting a balanced mix of oversight strategies to ensure more robust civilian control of the military.