JOURNAL ARTICLE

ON THE ECONOMIC MECHANICS OF WARFARE.

  • Published In: International Economic Review, 2025, v. 66, n. 2. P. 491 1 of 3

  • Database: Business Source Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Vandenbroucke, Guillaume 3 of 3

Abstract

How do war‐related expenditures affect economically relevant outcomes at a war's conclusion (e.g., prevailing side, duration, and casualties)? I present a model of attrition and characterize the effects of resources at a military conclusion (one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (one side quits). I analyze the Pacific War through the lenses of the model, both theoretically and empirically. I find that a parsimonious parameterization reproduces the aggregate patterns of destruction, measured in ship tonnage, for both belligerents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:International Economic Review. 2025/05, Vol. 66, Issue 2, p491
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:History
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:0020-6598
  • DOI:10.1111/iere.12740
  • Accession Number:185185891
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of International Economic Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Looking to go deeper into this topic? Look for more articles on EBSCOhost.