Illegal Market Governance and Organized Crime Groups' Resilience: A Study of The Sinaloa Cartel.

This article examines the resilience of the Sinaloa Cartel, a prominent Mexican organized crime group (OCG), arguing that its longevity and capacity to withstand adversity are partly due to its implementation of illegal governance practices within the illicit markets it controls. Drawing on testimonies from former cartel members during the prosecution of Joaquín Guzmán Loera (El Chapo), the study identifies four key governance dimensions—judicial, financial, political, and regulatory—that have fostered internal cohesion, regulated economic exchanges, institutionalized corruption with officials, and controlled member behavior. These governance mechanisms have contributed to the cartel's ability to manage conflicts, maintain loyalty, and reduce operational uncertainties, thereby enhancing its endurance despite law enforcement pressures and violent competition. The findings suggest that illegal governance practices can be a critical factor in explaining the resilience of specific OCGs, complementing other known influences such as community support and organizational structure.