Monopoly Versus Duopoly in Sports Broadcasting: Consumer Surplus Implications.

This article analyzes the downstream market for sports broadcasting rights, comparing consumer surplus outcomes under two market structures: a monopoly where a single broadcaster offers the entire league’s matches as a package, and a duopoly where two broadcasters hold exclusive, non-overlapping subsets of matches requiring consumers to subscribe to both to access the full product. Using a model with consumer valuations for the full package and components, the study finds that consumer surplus is higher under monopoly when consumers’ valuation for the full product relative to individual components is sufficiently high and marginal costs are low; conversely, duopoly benefits consumers when this relative valuation is low or marginal costs are higher. The findings highlight that fragmentation of broadcasting rights does not unambiguously increase consumer welfare and that the trade-off depends on consumer preferences and cost structures. The paper suggests that policy and industry decisions regarding sports broadcasting market structures should consider these context-specific factors to avoid potential detriment to consumers.