Cartel leniency programme in India—why no race here?

This article critically examines the implementation of the cartel leniency programme by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) from 2009 to 2021, finding limited success in encouraging cartel members to come forward. Despite theoretical expectations that prima facie cartel findings would incentivize leniency applications, the study reveals no significant "race to the agency," attributing this to inconsistent penalty determinations, unclear application of mitigating and aggravating factors, and fears of additional costs such as private compensation claims and bidding bans. The CCI's penalty framework often lacks correlation with actual cartel harm or gains, and bid-rigging cases are frequently penalized less stringently while still qualifying for leniency, creating enforcement asymmetries. The article suggests reforms including clearer penalty guidelines based on price overcharges, enhanced transparency, whistle-blower rewards, and protections against excessive private damages to improve deterrence and the effectiveness of the leniency programme.