Subsidiary and the structure of property law^†.

This article examines the structure of property law through the principle of subsidiarity, which holds that centralized authorities, including governments, should only intervene when smaller entities—individuals or groups—cannot adequately fulfill certain functions. While subsidiarity has been influential in public, constitutional, and international law, its application to property law has been underexplored. The article argues that property rights distribute decision-making authority to non-state actors, enabling distinct contributions to the common good, promoting decentralized decision-making, fostering individual involvement, and supporting virtue development. At the same time, public authorities retain the power to regulate or limit owner authority when necessary to uphold the common good, reflecting a distinctive public-private law divide. This subsidiarity-based framework offers a normative foundation reconciling progressive property theories emphasizing social obligations with those prioritizing owner authority, and it informs key doctrinal issues such as owners’ agenda-setting powers, public access rights, community governance, and legal protections against government interference.