The Politics of Punishment: Why Dictators Join the International Criminal Court.

This article examines how dictatorships strategically engage with international law and organizations, focusing on the International Criminal Court (ICC), to maintain power rather than promote democracy. It argues that dictators are more likely to join the ICC when facing strong domestic political competition because ICC membership imposes asymmetric costs that constrain both the dictator and their opponents, but disproportionately limit opposition violence. Using a formal model and empirical analysis of dictatorships from 1998 to 2018, the study finds that dictatorships with higher political competition are more likely to join the ICC, that ICC membership is associated with reduced overall violence, and that dictators who join the ICC tend to have increased survival in office. The findings suggest that while international law and the ICC can reduce violence, they may also inadvertently strengthen authoritarian rulers by enabling them to use international mechanisms to suppress political opponents, raising complex normative questions about the effects of international justice on domestic governance.