Do Unjust States Have the Standing to Blame? Three Reservations About Scepticism.

The article examines whether an unjust state that has subjected offenders to criminogenic injustice—conditions that increase the likelihood of crime—retains the moral standing to blame those offenders for their crimes. It challenges scepticism about the state's standing to blame by presenting three reservations: first, that concerns often stem from the content of state condemnation, which can be addressed by the state acknowledging its own complicity; second, that authoritative public condemnation by the state is necessary for adequate legal recognition and protection of victims' fundamental moral rights; and third, that even if the state's standing to blame is compromised, offenders may still benefit from engaging with the state's criticism. The article concludes that unjust states should continue to condemn crimes while also condemning their own wrongdoing, thereby enhancing rather than eschewing moral judgment of crime.