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Against the Recidivist Premium.

  • Published In: Tulane Law Review, 2024, v. 98, n. 3. P. 411 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Krishnamurthi, Guha 3 of 3

Abstract

The American penal system is broken. The state of mass incarceration is wreaking havoc on individuals, families, and communities. These effects are unequally levied upon and borne by communities of color and people who are poor. This state of aBirs is morally odious and intolerable. One main component of mass incarceration is the deployment of the "recidivist premium"=that is, the imposition of additional punishment on repeat offenders compared tofirst time oj®nders who commit the same offense, This Article contends that, in light of our reasons for punishment, the recidivist premium is unjustified and harmful. As a result, I argue that we should abolish our penal systems deployment of the recidivist premium based on our current state of information. This Article sets forth a comprehensive case against the use of the recidivist premium. First, Ishow that the recidivist premium does not accord with our retributive theories of desert. Then, I explain that on our best empirical evidence, theD·ecidivist premium does notfurther the principal consequentialist benefits of punishment, namely deterrence and incapacitation. Finally, I show that the recidivist premium does not advance the aims of sentencing design, including consistency, calculability, predictability, and ejficiency. To live up to our ideals of equality and human dignity, we must restore the rights of those convicted of crimes when they reenter society and treat them as full members of their polity. Any differential treatment must be specially and rigorously justified. The recidivist premium does not salish that demanding standard, and thus, it should not stand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Tulane Law Review. 2024/02, Vol. 98, Issue 3, p411
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Law
  • Publication Date:2024
  • ISSN:0041-3992
  • Accession Number:176519264
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