Revisiting the Principal–Agent Framework in the Context of Projects: Drawing Parallels with Corporate Governance.

This article critically revisits the principal–agent framework within the context of projects by drawing parallels with its established application in corporate governance. It conceptualizes organizations and projects as nexuses of multilevel principal–agent and principal–principal relationships, highlighting key differences in relationship structures, agency costs, investment returns, and governance challenges between permanent organizations (notably corporations) and three distinct project archetypes. The analysis underscores the dynamic, temporary, and complex nature of project-based principal–agent relationships, which often involve multiple stakeholders and interorganizational interactions, thereby complicating traditional governance approaches. The article advocates for adapting and indigenizing the principal–agent framework to better suit project contexts, emphasizing the importance of addressing principal–principal conflicts and expanding the framework to include broader stakeholder considerations. It calls for further empirical research to develop project-centric governance theories and practical mechanisms that effectively manage the multifaceted agency dynamics inherent in diverse project types.