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How policing incentives affect crime, measurement, and justice.

  • Published In: Economic Inquiry, 2025, v. 63, n. 2. P. 545 1 of 3

  • Database: Academic Search Ultimate 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Adamson, Jordan; Rentschler, Lucas 3 of 3

Abstract

In this paper we develop a model where the police choose between investigating and patrolling, while civilians choose between producing and stealing. We derive a truth table for the equilibrium numbers of criminals and producers, punished or not, that can holistically evaluate the effects of police performance incentives. To test the model, we conduct an experiment that varies how severely an officer is reprimanded for false punishments. We find that stronger reprimands do not change crime, increase civilian incomes, and decrease false positives. We also find that the clearance rate, a measure of performance used widely in econometric studies, suggests police performance is better when it is unambiguously worse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:Economic Inquiry. 2025/04, Vol. 63, Issue 2, p545
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Law
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:0095-2583
  • DOI:10.1111/ecin.13270
  • Accession Number:183691555
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of Economic Inquiry is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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