JOURNAL ARTICLE
Strengthening police oversight: The impacts of misconduct investigators on police officer behavior.
Published In: Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, 2025, v. 44, n. 4. P. 1286 1 of 3
Database: Business Source Ultimate 2 of 3
Authored By: Jordan, Andrew; Kim, Taeho 3 of 3
Abstract
We study how civilian complaint investigators affect officer behavior in Chicago. We exploit quasi‐random assignment of complaints to supervising investigators and use variation in whether supervisors tend to acquire sworn affidavits that substantiate the complaints. When the assigned investigator opens more investigations through obtaining affidavits, accused officers accumulate fewer complaints in the first three months of the investigation. We find that, prior to a scandal, assignment to high‐investigation supervisors causes officers to make more arrests. However, this reverses after the scandal. Our findings suggest that police watchdogs can improve officer behavior in ordinary oversight environments but may backfire in heightened oversight environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Additional Information
- Source:Journal of Policy Analysis & Management. 2025/10, Vol. 44, Issue 4, p1286
- Document Type:Article
- Subject Area:Law
- Publication Date:2025
- ISSN:0276-8739
- DOI:10.1002/pam.70002
- Accession Number:188175271
- Copyright Statement:Copyright of Journal of Policy Analysis & Management is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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