Abortion, Impairment, and Well-Being.

This article critically examines Perry Hendricks' The Impairment Argument (TIA), which claims that abortion is immoral because it impairs a fetus to a greater degree than causing fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), an act already deemed immoral. The author argues that TIA can only succeed if it presupposes a theory of well-being—such as perfectionism, hedonism, or desire satisfaction theory (DST)—to explain why causing FAS is immoral, why abortion impairs more severely, and to satisfy the argument's ceteris paribus clause. However, no such theory fully meets these criteria, and even if one did, TIA would merely restate existing well-known arguments against abortion without advancing the debate. Consequently, the article concludes that TIA is unoriginal, inherits the problems of the underlying well-being theory it depends on, and should be rejected by those who do not accept that theory.