Assessing the Effects of Amendment Rules in Federal Systems: Australia and Switzerland Compared.

This article examines the effects of formal constitutional amendment rules through a comparative analysis of Australia and Switzerland, two federations that share an identical "direct-democratic model of constitutional change" requiring a double majority of both the national electorate and constituent units for amendments. The study finds that the direct effects of these amendment rules similarly protect minorities deemed significant at federation—religious minorities in Switzerland and numerically smaller states in Australia—while overlooking other minority groups, such as linguistic minorities in Switzerland. However, the indirect effects on federal dynamics differ markedly due to the broader institutional contexts ("institutional embeddedness"): Switzerland's amendment rule supports a decentralized federal order, whereas in Australia, interactions with parliamentary sovereignty, intergovernmental councils, judicial review, and limited direct democracy have contributed to strong centralizing trends. The findings highlight that formal amendment rules cannot be fully understood or designed in isolation but must be considered within their specific political and cultural institutional frameworks, with implications for constitutional design in diverse and post-colonial societies.