JOURNAL ARTICLE

THE NEUROSCIENCE OF EVIDENTIARY RULES: THE CASE OF THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION.

  • Published In: SMU Law Review, 2025, v. 78, n. 3. P. 827 1 of 3

  • Database: Legal Source 2 of 3

  • Authored By: Sundby, Christopher S. 3 of 3

Abstract

The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) play a critical role in federal trials by determining what evidence the jury will be allowed to hear. Nonetheless, the rules are largely premised on untested psychological assumptions. The Present Sense Impression Rule (PSIR), for example, is an exception to the general ban against hearsay based on the assumptions that statements about contemporaneous events have fewer memory errors; are less likely to be lies; and, when they are lies, that listeners are better able to detect the lie than if the declarant has had time to prepare. The rule, in other words, is based on assumptions that can be empirically tested. This Article surveys the scientific literature for insight into whether PSI statements have fewer memory errors and uses novel behavioral paradigms and electroencephalography (EEG) measures to test whether substantial contemporaneity is a safeguard against deceit. I conclude that PSI statements are likely to have fewer memory errors and the experimental results suggest that true contemporaneity, but not "substantial" contemporaneity, offers a degree of protection against deceit. Furthermore, the lies that do occur align with the protections inherent to the PSIR, with contemporaneous lies being more detectable by a third-party observer and lies about past events being susceptible to effective cross-examination. Specifically, the results of the first experiment suggest that people switch cognitive strategies when lying about a contemporaneous event compared to a past event, employing a less working-memory-intensive strategy when given a delay. This switch lessens behavioral tells but may come at a cost to the overall memory of the event. The second experiment finds that even in a more behaviorally complex paradigm, individuals made significantly fewer errors and lied significantly more often when given a delay as short as three seconds to prepare their response, compared to a truly contemporaneous response prompted within 500 milliseconds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Additional Information

  • Source:SMU Law Review. 2025/10, Vol. 78, Issue 3, p827
  • Document Type:Article
  • Subject Area:Law
  • Publication Date:2025
  • ISSN:10661271
  • DOI:10.25172/smulr.78.3.12
  • Accession Number:191320929
  • Copyright Statement:Copyright of SMU Law Review is the property of SMU Law Review Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Looking to go deeper into this topic? Look for more articles on EBSCOhost.