Supererogatory and obligatory rescues: Should we institutionalize the duty to intervene?

For instance, while State B may have the military capacity to intervene, it may still be too risky for B to intervene alone, or doing so may be very costly for the citizens of State B. As in the Dangerous Beach cases, B could perhaps ask other states to join in a "coalition of the willing." For example, the financial costs faced by militaries include the costs of transport or equipment, whereas the financial costs faced by civilians (including neutral civilians, e.g., in neighboring countries) include the cost of replacing damaged property and the cost of lost business. Keywords: duty to rescue; Good Samaritan; humanitarian intervention; just war theory; responsibility to protect EN duty to rescue Good Samaritan humanitarian intervention just war theory responsibility to protect 183 200 18 06/06/23 20230601 NES 230601 INTRODUCTION The academic debate on armed humanitarian intervention has, in the last 20 or so years, largely moved on from the question of whether it can sometimes be permissible to intervene in another state (i.e., whether there is a right to intervene), to questions regarding, for instance, the existence of a duty to intervene, the allocation of the responsibility to intervene, and so on. So if we only look at country A and country B, or country A and country C, and so on - the kinds of assessments the individual rescue analogy would have us consider - we would be likely to conclude that rescue, while permissible, cannot be required in this case, given that for each country B, C, and so on, rescue would not be required.[2] However, Dangerous Beach shows us that there is another way to look at this case. [Extracted from the article]